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REPLY ARGUMENT 
THE LEAD-IN POLICY LANGUAGE RELIED ON BY 
STATE FARM DOES NOT DETERMINE THE MEANING 
OF THE "EARTH MOVEMENT" EXCLUSION HERE. 
Defendant State Farm is correct in admitting that 
courts have traditionally rejected earth movement exclusions 
under an "efficient predominant cause" analysis or an "ejusdem 
generis" analysis. Defendant is correct in arguing that its 
new lead-in language defeats the efficient predominant cause 
analysis. Defendant is incorrect in arguing that its new 
language defeats the rule of ejusdem generis. The phrase 
"earth movement" remains undefined, and must be construed in 
the context of its surrounding terms (i.e. ejusdem generis) and 
according to its ordinary usage and meaning. 
A fair reading of the insurance journal articles in 
defendant's Addendum shows that the new lead-in language was 
added to defeat only the "efficient predominant cause" 
analysis. That analysis resulted in coverage when an uncovered 
peril was set in motion by a covered peril. Plainly, the 
change was tailored to overcome that argument. But that is not 
the argument plaintiff makes here. 
Plaintiff's argument is that in light of both the 
immediately surrounding policy language and common usage, a 
layman could reasonably understand the phrase "earth movement" 
to mean only natural disasters and natural forces. Is that a 
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reasonable interpretation of the phrase? That is the ques-
tion. Because the answer is yes, coverage follows. 
Defendant begs the question. Defendant argues that 
its new lead-in language excludes the listed events regardless 
of cause. But the question is the meaning and definition of 
the excluded "events" themselves. If the phrase "earth move-
ment" is construed to mean only natural and geologic forces, no 
amount of boiler plate lead-in language can change that. 
Defendant's argument that the excluded event should be con-
strued by the lead-in language rather than the language of the 
exclusion itself is tantamount to "the tail wagging the dog". 
In its 1983 policy revisions, defendant had the opportunity to 
define the "earth movement" exclusion as applying to events 
other than natural events, but defendant did not do so. 
The California cases in defendant's Addendum do not 
help any more than the insurance journal articles. First, in 
none of those cases did the insured argue that the "earth move-
ment" clause is reasonably construed as meaning only natural 
and geologic forces. As best can be determined from these 
"opinions", the insureds were generally arguing efficient pre-
dominant cause or other issues unrelated to the case at hand. 
Second, with the exception of State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Martin, 668 F.Supp. 1379 (D. Cal. 1987), aff'd. , No. 87-6109 
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(9th Cir. April 10, 1989), these decisions appear to be unpub-
lished state trial court orders, of limited value as precedent. 
Plaintiff submits two additional points in reply: 
1. More and more, this Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have been resorting to Webster's Dictionary to ascertain 
ordinary meaning. In Bear River Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Wright, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Utah App. March 14, 1989), this 
Court reversed a summary judgment granted to the carrier in an 
insurance coverage case. The critical question was whether an 
exclusion for unlisted MautomobilesM excluded coverage for 
motorcycles. This Court held that: 
In the absence of a clear and unambiguous 
definition in the policy, the term "auto-
mobile" should be given its common sense, 
plain meaning. 
Id. at 42. The Court then used Webster's Dictionary to deter-
mine plain meaning and held that the exclusion did not apply 
there. As mentioned in plaintiff's opening brief, the plain 
meaning of "earth movement" is defined by Webster as a geologic 
term. According^, tlv s exclusion does not apply here. 
2. Defendant unfairly accuses plaintiff of failing 
to "quote" the lead-in language. The first page of plaintiff's 
Addendum is the earth movement exclusion, complete with the 
lead-in language. More important, that language does not help 
define the meaning of the "earth movement" exclusion here. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's construction of the undefined phrase 
"earth movement" varies from ordinary meaning and the immedi-
ately surrounding policy language. This is contrary to Utah 
law, which requires that, in the absence of definition, a 
phrase in an insurance policy will be given its ordinary mean-
ing and construed in light of the surrounding policy language. 
The question is whether a layman could reasonably 
understand the phrase "earth movement" to mean only natural, 
geologic forces. This Court should follow the majority of 
jurisdictions that have faced this question, and answer in the 
affirmative. 
Plaintiff urges that the summary judgment in favor of 
defendants be reversed with directions that the District Court 
grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this / J day of May, 1989. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Chomas J. Erbin^ 
By ^S^'^^^/^rf*^ *£-*-=— 
/ Tl>6 rbir ' 
(^ Tames A. Boevers 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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